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It was an exceedingly long lay that, indeed; and though
from the magnitude of the figure it might at first
deceive a landsman, yet the slightest consideration will
show that though seven hundred and seventy-seven is a
pretty large number, yet, when you come to make a
teenth of it, you will then see, I say, that the seven
hundred and seventy-seventh part of a farthing is a
good deal less than seven hundred and seventy-seven
gold doubloons; and so I thought at the time.
Moby-Dick, or The Whale
Herman Melville
Abstract
The eigenvector centrality equation λx = Ax is a successful compro-
mise between simplicity and expressivity. It claims that central actors are
those connected with central others. For at least 70 years, this equation
has been explored in disparate contexts, including econometrics, sociom-
etry, bibliometrics, Web information retrieval, and network science. We
propose an equally elegant counterpart: the power equation x = Ax÷,
where x÷ is the vector whose entries are the reciprocal of those of x. It
asserts that power is in the hands of those connected with powerless oth-
ers. It is meaningful, for instance, in bargaining situations, where it is
advantageous to be connected to those who have few options. We tell the
parallel, mostly unexplored story of this intriguing equation.
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1 A portrait of power
A network consists of a crowd of actors and a set of binary relations that tie pairs
of actors. Networks are pervasive in the real world. Nature, society, information,
and technology are supported by ostensibly different networks that in fact share
an amazing number of interesting structural properties.
Networks are modelled in mathematics as graphs : actors are represented as
points (also called nodes or vertices) and relations are depicted as lines (also
called edges or arcs) connecting pairs of points. In this work we focus on undi-
rected graphs, where the edges do not have a particular orientation. A meaning-
ful question on networks is the following: which are the most central (important)
nodes? Many measures have been proposed to address this question. Among
them, eigenvector centrality1 states that an actor is central if it is connected
with central actors. This circular definition is captured by an elegant recursive
equation:
λx = Ax (1)
where x is a vector containing the sought centralities, A is a matrix encoding the
network, and λ is a positive constant. Two actors in a network that are tied by
an edge are said to be neighbors. Equation 1 claims two important properties of
centrality: (i) the centrality of an actor is directly correlated with the number
of its neighbors; and (ii) the centrality of an actor is directly correlated with
the centrality of its neighbors. Central actors are those with many ties or, for
equal number of ties, central actors are those who are connected with central
others. This intriguing definition has been discovered and rediscovered many
times in different contexts. It has been investigated, in chronological order, in
econometrics, sociometry, bibliometrics, Web information retrieval, and network
science (see [12] for an historical overview).
In some circumstances, however, centrality – the quality of being connected
to central ones – has limited utility in predicting the locus of power in networks
[11, 8, 2]. Consider exchange networks, where the relationship in the network
involves the transfer of valued items (i.e., information, time, money, energy).
A set of exchange relations is positive if exchange in one relation promotes ex-
change in others and negative if exchange in one relation inhibits exchange in
others [7]. In negative exchange networks, power comes from being connected to
those who have few options. Being connected to those who have many possibil-
ities reduces one’s power. Think, for instance, to a social network in which time
is the exchanged value. Imagine that every actor has a limited time to listen
to others and that each actor divides its time between its neighbors. Clearly,
exchange of time in one relation precludes the exchange of the same time in
other relations. What are the actors that receive most attention? These are
the nodes that are connected to many neighbors with few options, since they
receive almost full attention from all their neighbors. On the other hand, actors
connected to few neighbors with a lot of possibilities receive little consideration,
since their neighbors are mostly busy with others.
1In this paper we will refer to eigenvector centrality simply as centrality.
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In this paper we propose a theory on power in the context of networks.
We start by the following thesis: An actor is powerful if it is connected with
powerless actors. We implement this circular thesis with the following equation:
x = Ax÷ (2)
where x is the sought power vector, A is a matrix encoding the network and
x÷ is the vector whose entries are the reciprocal of those of x. Equation 2
states two important properties of power: (i) the power of an actor is directly
correlated with the number of its neighbors; and (ii) the power of an actor is
inversely correlated with the power of its neighbors. The first property seems
reasonable: the more ties an actor has, the more powerful the actor is. The
second property characterizes power: for equal number of ties, actors that are
linked to powerless others are powerful; on the other hand, actors that are tied
to powerful others are powerless.
We investigate the existence and uniqueness of a solution for Equation 2
exploiting well-known results in combinatorial matrix theory. We study how to
regain the solution when it does not exist, by perturbing the matrix representing
the network. We formally relate the introduced notion of power with alterna-
tive ones and empirically compare them on the European natural gas pipeline
network.
2 Motivating example
In his seminal work on power-dependance relations, dated 1962, Richard Emer-
son claims that power is a property of the social relation, not an attribute of the
person: “X has power” is vacant, unless we specify “over whom”. Power resides
implicitly in other’s dependance, and dependance of an actor A upon actor B is
(i) directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B,
and (ii) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside the
A–B relation. The availability fo such goals outside of the relation refers to al-
ternatives avenues of goal-achievement, most notably other social relations [11].
This type of relational power is endogenous with respect to the network struc-
tures, meaning that it is a function of the position of the node in the network.
Exogenous factors, such as allure or charisma, which are external to the network
structure, might be added to endogenous power to complete the picture.
We begin with some small, archetypal examples typically used in exchange
network theory to informally illustrate the notion of power and sometimes to
distinguish it from the intersecting concept of centrality [10]. Consider a 2-node
path:
A−B
The situation is perfectly symmetric and a reasonable prediction is that both
actors have the same power. In a 3-node path
A−B − C
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much is changed. Intuitively, B is powerful, and A and C are not. Indeed, both
A and C have no alternative venues besides B (both depend on B), while B can
exclude one on them by choosing the other.2 A different basis for B’s power
might be implicit in the economic principle of satiation (see Chapter 12 in [10]).
In a 4-node path
A−B − C −D
actors B and C hold power, while A and D are dependent on either B or C.
Nevertheless, the power of B is less here than in the 3-node path: in both cases,
A depends on B, but in the 3-node path, also C depends on B, while in the
4-node path C has an alternative (node D). Hence, node B is less powerful in
the 4-node path with respect to the 3-node path since its neighbors are more
powerful. Finally, the 5-node path
A−B − C −D − E
is interesting since it discriminates power from centrality. All traditional central
measures (eigenvector, closeness, betweenness) claim that C is the central one.
Nevertheless, B and D are reasonably the powerful ones. Again, this because
they negotiate with weak partners (A and C or E and C), while C bargains
with strong parties (B and D). This example is useful to illustrate an additional
subtle aspect of power. Notice that in both the 5-node path and the 4-node path
B is surrounded by nodes (A and C) that are locally similar (for instance, they
have the same degree in both paths). However, the power of C is reasonably
less in the 5-node path than in the 4-node path, hence we might expect that
the power of B is higher in the 5-node path with respect to the 4-node path.
This separation is only possible if the notion of power spans beyond the local
neighborhood of a node (for example, if power is recursively defined).
As a larger and more realistic example, consider Figure 1, which depicts the
European natural gas pipeline network. Nodes are European countries (country
codes according to ISO 3166-1) and there is an undirected edge between two
nations if there exists a natural gas pipeline that crosses the borders of the
two countries. Data has been downloaded from the website of the International
Energy Agency (www.iea.org). The original data corresponds to a directed,
weighted multigraph, with edge weights corresponding to the maximum flow of
the pipeline. We simplified and symmetrized the network, mapping the edge
weights in a consistent way.
This is a negative exchange network, since the exchange of gas with a country
precludes the exchange of the very same gas with others. Intuitively, powerful
countries are those connected with states that have few possibilities to exchange
the gas. Suppose that country B is connected to countries A and C, and B is
the only connection for them: A − B − C. Countries A and C can sell or buy
gas only from B, while country B can chose between A and C. Reasonably, the
2We assume here the so called 1-exchange rule, meaning that each node may exchange
with at most 1 neighbor. Equivalently, we consider negative exchange network, in which the
exchange in one relation inhibits exchange in others.
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Figure 1: The European natural gas pipeline network.
bargaining power of B is higher, and this traduces in higher revenues or less
expenses for B in the gas negotiation.
3 A theory on power
Let G be an undirected, weighted graph. The graph G may contain loops, that
are edges from a node to itself. The edges of G are labelled with positive weights.
Let A be the adjacency matrix of G, that is Ai,j is the weight of edge (i, j) if
such edge exists, and Ai,j = 0 otherwise. Hence A is a square, symmetric, non-
negative matrix. Loops in G correspond to elements in the main diagonal of
A.
The centrality problem is as follows: find a vector x with positive entries
such that
λx = Ax. (3)
where λ > 0 is a constant. This means that λxi =
∑
j Ai,j xj , that is, the
centrality of a node is proportional to the weighted sum of centralities of its
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neighbors. Notably, this is the main idea behind PageRank, Google’s original
Web page ranking algorithm. PageRank determines the importance of a Web
page in terms of the importance assigned to the pages hyperlinking to it. Be-
sides Web information retrieval, this thesis has been successfully exploited in
disparate contexts, including bibliometrics, sociometry, and econometrics [12].
We define the power problem as follows: find a vector x with positive entries
such that
x = Ax÷. (4)
where we denote with x÷ the vector whose entries are the reciprocals of those of
x. This means that xi =
∑
j Ai,j/xj , that is, the power of a node is equal to the
weighted sum of reciprocals of power of its neighbors. Notice that if λx = Ax÷,
then, setting y =
√
λx, we have that y = Ay÷, hence the proportionality
constant λ is not necessary in the power equation. This notion of power is
relevant on negative exchange networks [8, 2]. On this networks, when a value
is exchanged between actors along a relation, it is consumed and cannot be
exchanged along another relation. Hence, important actors are those in contact
with many actors having few exchanging possibilities.
Finally, the balancing problem is the following: find a diagonal matrix D
with positive main diagonal such that
S = DAD
is doubly stochastic, that is, all rows and columns of S sum to 1. The balancing
problem is a fundamental question that is claimed to have first been used in the
1930’s for calculating traffic flow [4] and since then it has been applied in many
disparate contexts [16].
It turns out that the power problem is intimately related to the balancing
problem. Given a vector x, let Dx be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries
coincide with those of x. We have the following result.
Theorem 1. The vector x is a solution of the power problem if and only if the
diagonal matrix Dx÷ is a solution for the balancing problem.
Proof. If DAD is doubly stochastic, then DADe = e and eTDAD = eT , where
e is a vector of all 1s. Actually, since A and D are symmetric, it holds that
DADe = e ⇔ eTDAD = eT . If the vector x does not have zero entries, then
Dx is invertible and D
−1
x = Dx÷ . We have that: x = Ax
÷ ⇔ Dxe = ADx÷e⇔
e = D−1x ADx÷e⇔ e = Dx÷ADx÷e.
3.1 Existence and unicity of a solution
The link between the balancing and the power problem that we established in
Theorem 1 allows us to investigate a solution of the power problem (Equation
4) using the well-sedimented theory of matrix balancing.
We recall that diagonal of a square n×n matrix is a sequence of n elements
that lie on different rows and columns of the matrix. A permutation matrix
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is a square n × n matrix that has exactly one entry 1 in each row and each
column and 0s elsewhere. Clearly, each diagonal corresponds to a permutation
matrix where the positions of the diagonal elements correspond to those of the
unity entries of the permutation matrix. In particular, the identity matrix I
is a permutation matrix and the diagonal of A associated with I is called the
main diagonal of A. A diagonal is positive if all its elements are greater than
0. A matrix A is said to have support if it contains a positive diagonal, and it
is said to have total support if A 6= 0 and every positive element of A lies on a
positive diagonal. Clearly, total support implies support.
A matrix is indecomposable (irreducible) if it is not possible to find a per-
mutation matrix P such that
PTAP =
(
X Y
0 Z
)
where X and Z are both square matrices and 0 is a matrix of 0s, otherwise A is
decomposable (reducible). A matrix is fully indecomposable if it is not possible
to find permutation matrices P and Q such that
PAQ =
(
X Y
0 Z
)
where X and Z are both square matrices, otherwise A is partly decomposable.
Clearly, a matrix that is fully indecomposable is also irreducible. It also holds
that full indecomposability implies total support [5]. Moreover, the adjacency
matrix of a bipartite graph is never fully indecomposable, while the adjacency
matrix of a non-bipartite graph is fully indecomposable if and only if it has total
support and is irreducible [9]. We say that a graph has support, total support, is
irreducible, and is fully indecomposable if the corresponding adjacency matrix
has these properties.
The combinatorial notions presented above are rather terse. Fortunately,
most of them have a simple interpretation in graph theory. It is known that
irreducibility of the adjacency matrix corresponds to connectedness of the graph.
Moreover, given an undirected graph G, let us define a spanning cycle forest of
G a spanning subgraph of G whose connected components are single edges or
cycles (including loops, that are cycles of length 1). It is easy to realize that
there exists a correspondance between diagonals in the adjacency matrix and
spanning cycle forests in the graph. Hence a graph has support if and only if it
contains a spanning cycle forest and it has total support if and only if each edge
is included in a spanning cycle forest. Four examples are depicted in Figure 2.
The following is a well-known necessary and sufficient condition for the so-
lution of the balancing problem [22, 9].
Theorem 2. Let A be a symmetric non-negative square matrix. A necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a doubly stochastic matrix S of the
form DAD, where D is a diagonal matrix with positive main diagonal, is that
A has total support. If S exists, then it is unique. If A is fully indecomposable,
then matrix D is unique.
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Figure 2: Top-left: the graph has no support, since a spanning cycle forest is
missing. Top-right: the graph has support formed by edges (1, 4) and (2, 3) but
the support is not total (edges (1, 3) and (1, 2) are not part of any spanning
cycle graph). Bottom-left: the graph has total support but it is not irreducible,
hence it is not fully indecomposable. Bottom-right: the graph has total support,
is irreducible and not-bipartite, hence it is fully indecomposable.
It follows that the power problem x = Ax÷ has a solution exactly on the
class of graphs that have total support. Moreover, if the graph is fully indecom-
posable, then the solution is also unique.
3.2 Perturbation: regaining the solution
What about the power problem on graphs whose adjacency matrix has not total
support? For such graphs, the power problem has no solution. Nevertheless, a
solution can be regained by perturbing the adjacency matrix of the graph in a
suitable way. We investigate two perturbations on the adjacency matrix A:
1. Diagonal perturbation: ADα = A+αI, where α > 0 is a damping parameter
and I is the identity matrix;
2. Full perturbation: AFα = A + αE, where α > 0 is a damping parameter
and E is a full matrix of all 1s.
Matrix AFα is clearly fully indecomposable, it has total support and is irre-
ducible. Hence, the power problem (as well as the centrality one) on a fully
perturbed matrix has a unique solution. On the other hand, matrix ADα has
total support. Indeed, if Ai,j > 0 and i = j, then the main diagonal Ak,k,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n is positive and contains Ai,j . If i 6= j, then the diagonal
Ai,j , Aj,i, Ak,k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and k 6= i, j is positive and contains Ai,j . Thus,
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the power problem on a diagonally perturbed matrix has a solution. Moreover,
the solution is unique if A is irreducible, since it is known that for a symmetric
matrix A it holds that A is irreducible if and only if A + I is fully indecom-
posable [6]. Interestingly enough, the diagonal perturbation, besides providing
convergence of the method, is useful to incorporate exogenous power in the
model. By setting a positive value in the i-th position of the diagonal, we are
saying that node i has a minimal amount of power that is not a function of the
position of the node in the network. Hence, we can play with the diagonal of
the adjacency matrix to assign nodes with potentially different entry levels of
exogenous power.
Intuitively, the diagonal perturbation is less invasive than its full counterpart:
the former modifies the diagonal elements only, the latter touches all matrix
elements. However, how much invasive is the perturbation with respect to the
resulting power? To investigate this issue, we computed the correlation between
original and perturbed power solutions. A simple and intuitive measure of the
correlation between two rankings of size n is Kendall rank correlation coefficient
k, which is the difference between the fraction of concordant pairs c (the number
of concordant pairs divided by n(n− 1)/2) and that of discordant pairs d in the
two rankings: k = c − d. Since c + d = 1, we have that the probability that
two random pairs in the two rankings are concordant is c = (k + 1)/2 and
that for discordant pairs is d = (−k + 1)/2. The coefficient runs from -1 to 1,
with negative values indicating negative correlation, positive values indicating
positive correlation, and values close to 0 indicating independence. We used the
following network data sets: a social network among dolphins [18], the Madrid
train bombing terrorist network [14], a social network of Jazz musicians [13], a
network of friendships between members of a karate club [23], a collaboration
network of scholars in the field of network science [20], and a co-appearance
network of characters in the novel Anna Karenina by Lev Tolstoj [17].
The main outcomes of the current experiment are as follows (see Figure 3):
(i) as soon as the damping parameter is small, both diagonal and full pertur-
bations do not significantly change the original power; (ii) power with diagonal
perturbation is closer to original power than power with full perturbation; (iii)
the larger the damping parameter, the lower the adherence of perturbed solu-
tions to the original one.
3.3 Computing power
Due to the established relationship between the balancing problem and the
power problem, we can use known methods for the former in order to solve the
latter. The simplest approach to solve the Equation 4 is to set up the iterative
method
xk+1 = Ax
÷
k , (5)
known as Sinkhorn-Knopp method [22]. If we set x0 = e, the vector of all 1s,
then the first iteration x1 = Ae, that is x1(i) =
∑
j Ai,j is the degree di of i.
The second iteration x2 = A (Ae)
÷, that is x2(i) =
∑
j Ai,j/di is the sum of
9
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Figure 3: Correlation between original and perturbed powers varying the damp-
ing parameter from 0 to 1 on the largest biconnected component of the social
network among dolphins (which has total support). The horizontal line corre-
sponds to the correlation with diagonal perturbation and maximum damping.
The correlation on the other networks is similar.
reciprocals of the degrees of the neighbors of i.
If A has total support then the Sinkhorn-Knopp method converges (more
precisely, the even and odd iterates of the method converge to power vectors
that differ by a multiplicative constant). The convergence is linear with rate
of convergence that depends of the subdominant eigenvalue of the the balanced
matrix S = DAD (see Theorem 2) [22]. In some cases, however, the convergence
can be very slow. In [16] the authors propose a faster algorithm based on
Newton’s method that we now describe according to our setting and notations.
In order to solve Equation 4, we apply Newton’s method for finding the zeros
of the function f : Rn → Rn defined by f(x) = x − Ax÷. It is not difficult to
check that
∂fi
∂xj
(x) = δi,j +
Aij
x2j
, i, j = 1, . . . , n,
where δi,j = 1 if i = j and δi,j = 0 otherwise. We collect these partial derivatives
in the Jacobian matrix of f that turns to be
Jf (x) = I +AD(x2)÷ ,
where the squaring of x is to be intended entrywise. Formally, the Newton
method applied to the equation f(x) = 0 becomes
xk+1 = xk − J−1f (xk)f(xk)
= J−1f (xk)
(
Jf (xk)xk − f(xk)
)
= J−1f (xk)
(
xk +AD(x2
k
)÷xk − xk +Ax÷k
)
= 2J−1f (xk)Ax
÷
k .
To apply Newton’s method exactly it is necessary to solve a linear system at
each step and this would be too much expensive. Nevertheless an approximate
10
Network PM SK SK-D SK-F NM NM-D
Dolphin 73 294 300 72 47 30
Madrid 28 416 320 78 46 27
Jazz 42 300 288 78 37 27
Karate 42 – 494 52 – 31
Collaboration 65 – 9740 30 – 33
Karenina 24 – 1006 32 – 32
Table 1: Complexity of computation of power with different methods: PM
(benchmark), SK (SK without perturbations for totally supported networks),
SK-D (SK with diagonal perturbation and damping 0.15), SK-F (SK with full
perturbation and damping 0.01), NM (NM without perturbations for totally
supported networks), NM-D (NM with diagonal perturbation and damping
0.15).
solution of the system obtained by means of an iterative method is sufficient,
giving rise to an inner-outer iteration. This approach becomes appealing when
the matrix that has to be balanced is symmetric and sparse, which is the case
for the power problem on real networks [16].
We experimentally assessed the complexity of computation of power on the
above mentioned real social networks (in fact, we used the largest biconnected
component for the first three networks in order to work also with totally sup-
ported graphs). We use both Sinkhorn-Knopp method (SK for short) and New-
ton method (NM for short). We consider the computation on the original matrix
as well as on the perturbed ones. We use as a benchmark the complexity of the
computation of centrality using the power method (PM for short). The com-
plexity is expressed as the overall number of matrix-vector product operations.
If a matrix is sparse (this is the case for all tested networks), such operation
has linear complexity in the number of nodes of the graph. The main empirical
findings are summarized as follows (see Table 1): (i) SK on the original matrix
is significantly slower than PM and diagonal perturbation does not significantly
change its speed; (ii) full perturbation significantly increases the speed of SK so
that the complexity of SK with full perturbation and that of PM are compa-
rable; moreover, the larger the damping parameter, the faster the method; (iii)
NM on the original matrix is much faster than SK: its complexity is comparable
to that of fully perturbed SK and PM, and (iv) NM with diagonal perturbation
is even faster than NM and the larger the damping parameter, the faster the
method.
3.4 Relationship with alternative power measures
Bonacich has proposed a family of parametric measures depending on two pa-
rameters α and β [2]. If A is the adjacency matrix of the graph, the Bonacich
11
index x is defined as:
x = αAe + βAx. (6)
The index for a node is the sum of two components: a first one (weighted by
the parameter α) depends on the node’s degree, a second one (weighted by the
parameter β) depends on the index on the node’s neighbors. From Equation
6, under the condition that I − βA is not singular, it is possible to obtain the
following explicit representation of the proposed measure:
x = α(I − βA)−1Ae = α(
∞∑
k=0
βkAk+1)e. (7)
The equivalence with the infinite sum holds when |β| < 1/r, where r =
maxi |λi|, with λi the eigenvalues of A (that is, r is the spectral radius of A).
When the parameter β is positive, the index is a centrality measure. In partic-
ular, the measure approaches eigenvector centrality as a limit as β approaches
1/r. On the other hand, when β is negative, the index is a power measure:
it corresponds to a weighted sum of odd-length paths (with positive sign) and
even-length paths (with negative sign) [2]. Hence, powerful nodes correspond to
nodes with many powerless neighbors. Finally, when β = 0, the measure boils
down to degree centrality.
The difficulty with this measure is that it is parametric, that is, it depends
on parameters α and β. While it is simple to set the parameter α, and in
particular it can be used to assign exogenous power to nodes, the choice for the
parameter β in more delicate. In particular, the index makes sense when the
parameter |β| < 1/r, hence the spectral radius r must be computed or at least
approximated.
The precise relationship between Bonacich power (Bonacich index with neg-
ative β) and power defined in Equation 4 is explained as follows. If we set
x0 = (1/γ)e in Newton’s iteration for the computation of power described above
we obtain
x1 = 2γ(I + γ
2A)−1Ae.
But this first approximation is a member of the family of Bonacich’s measures
with α = 2γ and β = −γ2. Since β is negative, we are indeed facing a measure of
power. Hence, Bonacich power can be considered as a first-order approximation
of power using Newton method.
Bozzo et al. have investigated power measures on sets of nodes [3]. Given a
node set T let B(T ) be the set of nodes whose neighbors all belong to T . Notice
that nodes in B(T ) do not have connections outside T , hence are potentially
at the mercy of nodes in T . The authors define a power function p such that
p(T ) = |B(T )| − |T |. Hence, a set T is powerful if it has potential control
over a much larger set of neighbors B(T ). The power measure is interpreted
as the characteristic function of a coalition game played on the graph and the
Shapley value of the game, that is, the average marginal contribution to power
carried by a node when it is added to any node set, is proposed as a measure
of power for single nodes. Interestingly enough, the discovered game-theoretic
12
power measure corresponds to the second iteration of Sinkhorn-Knopp method
for the computation of power as defined by Equation 4, that is, to the sum of
reciprocals of neighbors’ degrees.
The study of power has a long history in economics (in its acceptation of
bargaining power) and sociology (in its interpretation of social power). Consider
the most basic case where just two actors A and B are involved in a negotiation
over how to divide one unit of money. Each party has an alternate option – a
backup amount that it can collect in case negotiations fails, say α for A and β
for B. A natural prediction, known as Nash’s bargaining solution [19], is that
the two actors will split the surplus s = 1−α−β, if any, equally between them:
if s < 0 no agreement among A and B is possible, since any division is worse
than the backup option for at least one of the party. On the other hand, if
s >= 0, then A and B will agree on α+ s/2 for A and β + s/2 for B.
A natural extension of the Nash bargaining solution from pairs of actors
to networks of actors has been proposed in [21, 8] and further investigated in
particular in [15, 1]. In the following, we describe the dynamics that captures
such an extension. Let A be the adjacency matrix of an undirected, unweighted
graph G. Hence Ai,j = 1 if there is an edge (i, j) in G and Ai,j = 0 otherwise.
Negotiation among actors is only possible along edges, each pair of actors on
an edge negotiate for a fixed amount of 1e, and each actor may conclude a
negotiation with at most 1 neighbor (1-exchange rule). For every edge (i, j),
define:
• Ri,j as the amount of revenue actor i receives in a negotiation with j;
• Li,j as the amount of revenue actor i receives in the best alternative ne-
gotiation excluding the one with j.
Notice that matrices R and L have the same zero-nonzero pattern of A. More
precisely, consider the following iterative process. We start with R
(0)
i,j = 1/2 for
all edges (i, j) and R
(0)
i,j = 0 elsewhere. Let N(i) be the set of neighbors of node
i. For t > 0, the best alternative matrix L(t) at time t is:
L
(t)
i,j =
{
maxk∈N(i)\j R
(t−1)
i,k if Ai,j = 1,
0 otherwise
Let the surplus s
(t)
i,j = 1 − L(t)i,j − L(t)j,i be the amount for which actors i and
j will negotiate at time t; notice that actor i will never accept an offer from j
less than his alternate option L
(t)
i,j and actor j will never accept an offer from i
less than her alternate option L
(t)
j,i . Then the profit matrix R
(t) at time t is:
R
(t)
i,j =


L
(t)
i,j + s
(t)
i,j/2 if Ai,j = 1 and s
(t)
i,j ≥ 0,
1− L(t)j,i if Ai,j = 1 and s(t)i,j < 0,
0 otherwise
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Notice that R
(t)
i,j +R
(t)
j,i = 1. That is, R
(t)
i,j and R
(t)
j,i is the Nash’s bargaining
solution of a negotiation between actors i and j given their alternate options
L
(t)
i,j and L
(t)
j,i . Let R be the fixpoint of the iterative process R
(t) for growing
time t. The Nash power xi of node i is the best revenue of actor i among its
neighbors, that is
xi = max
j
Ri,j
Among many other attractive results, [1] shows that the dynamics always
converge to a fixpoint solution. Nash power bears some analogy with the one
we propose and investigate in the present work, in particular both notions share
the same recursive powerful-is-linked-with-powerless philosophy. Nash power
for an actor i directly depends on the revenues of i among its neighbors, which
directly depend on the alternate options of i among its neighbors, which in-
versely depends on the revenues of neighbors of i, which determine the power of
neighbors of i. Hence, power of an actor somewhat inversely depends on power
of its neighbors.
Using Kendall correlation, we assessed the overlapping of power, as defined in
this paper, with centrality, degree, as well as Bonacich power (that is, Bonacich
index with negative parameter β), Shapley power (that is, the sum of recipro-
cals of neighbors’ degrees), and Nash power on the above mentioned real social
networks. The main empirical outcomes are summarized in the following (see
Table 2): (i) as expected, both power and centrality are positively correlated
with degree, but power is negatively correlated with centrality when the effect
of degree is excluded (we used partial correlation); (ii) power is positively cor-
related with Bonacich power and the association increases as the parameter β
declines below 0 down to −1/r, with r the spectral radius of the adjacency
graph matrix; moreover, the association is higher when the adjacency matrix is
perturbed; (iii) power is positively correlated with Shapley power and the asso-
ciation is generally stronger than with Bonacich power; (iv) power is positively
correlated with Nash bargaining network power, but the strength of the correla-
tion is generally weaker than with Shapley and Bonacich power. In particular,
we noticed that the Nash-based method maps the power scores of the nodes
of the surveyed networks into a small set of values, with very high frequency
for values close to 0, 0.5 and 1. Hence, it is difficult to discriminate different
gradations of power for nodes.
4 Motivating example reloaded
In the following we reload examples provided in Section 2 and use them as
a benchmark to compare the different notions of power described in Section
3.4. When the graphs are not totally supported (all the cases but the 2-node
path), we used diagonal perturbation with damping 0.15 to obtain a solution.
Moreover, we set Bonacich index parameters α = 1 and β = −0.85/r, where r
is the spectra radius of the graph.
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Network D C B S N
Dolphin 0.81 0.35 0.89 0.91 0.72
Madrid 0.62 0.33 0.69 0.68 0.48
Jazz 0.85 0.62 0.91 0.85 0.17
Karate 0.77 0.36 0.74 0.96 0.75
Collaboration 0.77 0.05 0.77 0.85 0.60
Karenina 0.75 0.45 0.62 0.89 0.86
Table 2: Correlation of power as defined in this paper with degree (D), cen-
trality (C), Bonacich power (B), Shapley power (S) and Nash power (N). For
the computation of power, we used diagonal perturbation (damping 0.15). For
Bonacich power we used α = 1 and β = −0.85/r, where r is the spectral radius
of the graph.
In the 2-node path all methods agree to give identical power to both nodes.
In the 3-node path A − B − C all methods agree that B is the powerful one.
Notably, Nash power assigns all power (1) to B and no power (0) to A and C,
while the other methods say that A and C hold a small amount of power. In the
4-node path A−B−C−D all methods claim that B and C are the powerful ones.
Moreover, all methods recognize that the power of B in this instance is less than
its power in the 3-node path. Finally, in the 5-node path A−B − C −D −D,
all methods discriminate B and D as the most powerful nodes, followed by C,
and finally A and E, with the only exception of Nash power, which assigns all
power (1) to B and D, and null power (0) to all other nodes (hence the central
node C has the same power as the peripheral nodes A and E, according to this
method). All methods, with the exception of Shapley, notice that the power of
B is higher in the 5-node path with respect to the 4-node path. This because
Shapley is a local method, while the other ones are global (recursive) methods.
Let us now reload the natural gas pipeline example. Figure 4 depicts the
network with node size proportional to node power. Notice how the power of
a node balances the reciprocal of power of its neighbors. We ranked all coun-
tries according to the alternative power measures. Below, we show the Kendall
correlation matrix for the following measures: Shapley power (S), Bonacich
power (B), power as defined in this paper (P), Nash power (B), and eigenvector
centrality (C):
S B P N C
S 1.00 0.82 0.90 0.69 0.41
B 0.82 1.00 0.84 0.61 0.46
P 0.90 0.84 1.00 0.72 0.47
N 0.69 0.61 0.72 1.00 0.36
C 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.36 1.00
As expected, P is well correlated with its approximations B and S. Moreover,
P is positively correlated with N, but the correlation strength is weeker. Also,
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Figure 4: The European natural gas pipeline network with node size propor-
tional to power.
the association between P and C is positive but week, and this is mostly ex-
plained by the association with degree of both measures. Indeed, if we exclude
the effect of degree, this correlation is negative, meaning that the variables are
negatively associated when the effect of degree is filtered out.
These associations are mirrored in the top-10 rankings and ratings listed in
Table 3. Notice how Germany (DE) is both powerful and central; Italy (IT) is
powerful but not central; Norway (NO) is central but not powerful, and there are
many countries that are neither powerful nor central outside the rankings. Italy
is the archetype of powerful country that is not central: it contracts with nations
that are both powerless and peripheral, namely Austria, Switzerland, Croatia,
Tunisia, Libya and Slovenia, with only Austria included in the top-10 power
list and only Austria and Switzerland included in the top-10 centrality list (and
not in the first positions). The ranking according to Nash power is somewhat
weird if compared with the other power measures; for instance, Germany has
bargaining power 0.5 and is only in 14th postion, tied in the standings with
other 12 countries. It is fair noticing that the generalized Nash bargaining
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P TR DE IT ES HU RU BG BE AT UK
6.26 6.09 5.54 5.50 4.62 4.53 3.99 3.60 3.29 3.09
B DE IT HU TR AT RU ES BE NO BG
7.07 4.58 4.06 3.73 3.41 3.37 3.29 3.23 2.92 2.76
S TR ES IT DE RU HU BG RO UK AT
2.92 2.70 2.56 2.54 2.46 2.23 1.95 1.67 1.53 1.51
N ES TR BG RU IT HU UK RO DK LV
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
C DE NO BE NL FR AT DK CH CZ UK
1.00 0.71 0.68 0.62 0.56 0.52 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.39
Table 3: The top-ten powerful and central countries in the European natural
gas exchange network.
solution has been originally proposed in the context of assignments problems
(eg., matching of apartments to tenants or students to colleges), and was not
suggested as a rating and ranking method for nodes in a network. For instance,
in the balanced matching over the gas network Italy preferably negotiates with
Libya and Turkey with Georgia. In fact, [8] proposes to use the negotiation
values obtained by each node in such a solution as a structural power measure
(see also Chapter 12 in [10] for a similar interpretation). According to the
experiments we made for this paper, this interpretation seems to be opinable,
but further investigation is necessarily to gain a solid conclusion.
5 Discussion
We have proposed a theory on power in the context of networks. The philosophy
underlying our notion of power claims that an actor is powerful if it is connected
with many powerless actors. This thesis has its roots and applications mainly in
sociology and economics, and this traces an historical parallel with its celebrated
linear counterpart, namely eigenvector centrality. The thesis is compiled into
an elegant power equation
x = Ax÷,
where x is power and A represents the network. We have investigated the
domain of existence and uniqueness of the power equation using results of com-
binatorial matrix theory. The power equation has a solution exactly on the
class of graphs that exhibit total support. Matrix perturbations of the original
network can be applied when the network is outside the existence domain. The
power equation can be solved using fast iterative methods. Finally, we tested
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and compared our notion of power on the natural gas pipeline network among
European nations.
The virtues of our definition of power are: (i) it is a simple, elegant, and un-
derstandable measure; (ii) it is theoretically well-grounded and directly related
to the well-studied balancing problem, making it possible to borrow results and
techniques from this setting; (iii) the formulation is not parametric; (iv) it is
global (the power of a node depends on the entire network) and can be approx-
imated with a simple local measure - the sum of reciprocals of node degrees -
which has a game-theoretic interpretation and can be efficiently computed on all
networks. The vices are: (i) an exact solution exists only on the class of totally
supported networks; (ii) it is not immediately normalizable, hence power values
for nodes on different networks must be compared with care.
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